An error correcting code is said to be locally testable if there is a test that checks whether a given string is a codeword, or rather far from the code, by reading only a constant number of symbols of the string. Locally Testable Codes (LTCs) were first systematically studied by Goldreich and Sudan (J. ACM 53(4)) and since then several constructions of LTCs have been suggested.
INTRODUCTION
An error correcting code is said to be locally testable if there is a test that checks whether a given string is a codeword, or far from the code, by reading only a constant number of symbols of the string. Somewhat more precisely, a code is locally testable if there exists an algorithm, called the verifier, that when given oracle access to a given string, makes a constant number of queries to the oracle, accepts
A general perspective
A PCP (Probabilistically Checkable Proof) is a proof that allows checking the validity of a claim by reading only a constant number of symbols of the proof. The PCP theorem [3, 2] asserts the existence of PCPs of polynomial length for any claim that can be stated as membership in an N P set. The theorem has found many applications, most notably in establishing lower bounds for approximation algorithms.
The discovery of PCPs of polynomial length, being remarkable by its own right, raises the natural question of how long should a proof be to enjoy local testability. Having shorter locally testable proofs also affects the various applications of PCPs. This consideration motivates the direct study of local testability, and the amount of redudancy it requires. LTCs are a natural tool for such study.
One motivation for studying LTCs stems from the structure of most PCP constructions. Usually, a PCP system for a given claim is constructed by encoding the proofs of the claim using a special syntax. This syntax allows checking that a string is a valid proof using a constant number of queries, provided that the string follows that syntax.
In order for such syntax to be useful, it usually has to have two additional properties: First, the verification procedure should be able to reject strings that are far from following the syntax using only a constant number of queries. Second, the syntax should have error-correction capabilities, in order to allow the verification procedure to function when it is given access to strings that are close to following the syntax, while not following it entirely. Locally Testable Codes are the most simple objects that possess the both of those properties, and we can therefore hope that a better understanding of LTCs will lead to better constructions of PCPs. Furthermore, we expect constructions of LTCs to be much simpler than constructions of PCPs, since LTCs are not required to allow proof checking.
Another motivation for the study of LTCs is that LTCs can be viewed as the "combinatorial counterparts" of PCPs: While PCPs are "complexity theoretic" objects that are locally testable, LTCs are combinatorial objects that are locally testable. Since combinatorial objects tend to be simpler than complexity theoretic ones, we again may expect the construction of LTCs to be simpler than the construction of PCPs.
Previous work. LTCs were first systematically studied by Goldreich and Sudan [13] . The construction of LTCs that achieves the smallest amount of redudancy was given by Ben-Sasson and Sudan [6] . Their construction yields a code that encodes k bits of information into k · poly (log k) bits. However, the verifier of their construction only rejects strings that are far from the code with probability of 1/ poly (log k). This limitation was waived later by Dinur [8] who, by applying her gap amplification technique to the construction of [6] , improved the rejection probability to a constant, while maintaining the block length of k · poly (log k). For a survey of the previous constructions of LTCs, we refer the reader to [11] .
Our result
Our work was motivated by two considerations: The first consideration is concerned with the fact that the previous constructions of LTCs either use PCPs as a building block, or directly imply a construction of PCPs (e.g. [13, 6] ). In contrast, when taking the view of Section 1.1, one might expect to have constructions of LTCs that are considerably weaker than those of PCPs. Thus, we would have liked to have a construction that does not rely on PCPs and furthermore does not directly give rise to constructions of PCPs.
The other consideration is concerned with the fact that the previous constructions of LTCs are very algebraic. In particular, the construction of [6] uses a very heavy algebraic machinery, even compared to the algebraic machinery common in the PCP literature, and its analysis is quite complicated. A simpler construction, of a combinatorial nature, would have been preferred.
In this paper we give a construction that achieves both the above goals: Our construction is purely combinatorial and does not use PCPs as a building block. We also believe that it does not directly imply a construction of PCPs. Our construction matches the parameters of the best known construction of [6] and [8] .
Explicitness. While our codes are not explicit in the usual sense, we show that there is a probabilistic algorithm that constructs, with overwhelming probability, the generating matrix of our codes for infinitely many message lengths.
We stress that even a completely non-explicit construction of LTCs that achieves good parameters would have been valuable. The reason is that, unlike the case of many combinatorial objects (such as expander graphs and extractors), a simple counting argument does not show the existence of LTCs, regardless of the parameters. In this regard we mention that Kaufman and Sudan [14] have recently showed that random linear codes with very poor rate are locally testable, while using a very sophisticated analysis. We also mention that the construction of [13] achieves exactly the same notion of explicitness as our construction.
Our techniques
Our construction consists of two main steps, which are analogous to the constructions of [6] and [8] : In the first step we give a construction that achieves block length of k · poly (log k), query complexity of poly (log k) and rejection probability of 1/ poly (log k). In the second step we reduce the query complexity to a constant and apply the gap amplification technique of [8] to amplify the rejection probability to a constant. Below we give a rough sketch of the techniques used in the first step of our construction, while the second step follows [8] quite closely.
Remark 1.
In this section we make extensive use of coding theory terminology. The reader is referred to Section 2.1 for an overview of this terminology.
Codes with Proofs. We begin our construction by introducing the notion of "Code with Proof" (CWP), which was implicit in some previous constructions ( [13, 4, 6] ). The notion of CWP is a generalization of the notion of LTC in which, in addition to the tested string, the verifier is given oracle access to a "proof string". The proof string can be thought as given by an untrusted prover that tries to convince the verifier to accept the string as a codeword. Intuitively, constructing a CWP should be easier than constructing a LTC, because we can use the proof string in our favor, while LTC can be seen as the special case of CWP where the proof string is empty. A construction of a CWP with short codewords and short proofs can then be transformed to a short LTC with similar parameters using a known reduction (see, e.g., [13, Sec. 5] and [4, Sec. 4.1] ). Thus, we can focus on constructing a CWP with good parameters.
We stress that, while the notion of CWP is closely related to PCP, it does not undermine our goal of constructing LTCs without PCP machinery. The crucial difference is that while a general PCP system should be able to prove any N Pclaim, a CWP is only expected to prove the membership of a string in a specific code.
We also note that the main step in the construction of [6] is constructing PCPPs for Reed-Solomon codes, which can be viewed as a special case of a CWP.
An iterative construction.
Our construction is an iterative one, and is similar in nature to the Zig-Zag construction of expander graphs by Reingold et al. [17] . The starting point of our construction is a code of small message length, which is trivially a CWP. We then increase the message length of this CWP iteratively. In every iteration, the parameters of the CWP change as follows:
1. The message length is squared. 2. The rate and the relative distance of the CWP remain intact. 3. The ratio of the message length to the proof length of the CWP decreases by a constant factor. 4. The query complexity of the verifier increases by a constant factor. 5. The rejection probability of the verifier decreases by a constant factor. After O(log log k) such iterations, we obtain a CWP of message length k, rate Ω(1), relative distance Ω(1), proof length k · poly (log k), query complexity poly (log k) and rejection probability 1/ poly (log k). Such a CWP translates into an LTC that has the required parameters.
The structure of a single iteration. A single iteration consists of applying to the CWP three basic operations, each aimed at improving or maintaing some other parameters of the CWP. The first basic operation is the tensor product of codes, which is used to square the message length of the CWP. The problem with this operation is that it squares the rate and relative distance of the CWP. In order to retain the relative distance, we use a known distance amplification technique (see, e.g., [1] ). The difficult part is maintaining the rate of the CWP.
In order to maintain the rate of the CWP, we use an operation called Random Projection, which consists of choosing a random subset of the coordinates of the code and moving them from the codeword part to the proof string part. This operation decreases the block length of the CWP at the expense of increasing its proof length. The reason that this operation is useful is that the tensor product operation has a better effect on the proof length of the CWP than on its block length, and this effect implies that it is beneficial to improve the block length at the expense of harming the proof length. In particular, by using the random projection operation, we are able to maintain the rate of the CWP at each iteration, while decreasing the ratio of the message length to the proof length of the CWP by merely a constant factor. This interplay between the tensor product and random projection operations is one of our main technical contributions, and some additional ideas are used to make it actually work (see Section 3.2).
By applying the three operations one after the other, we get an iteration that has the required effect on the parameters of the CWP.
Organization of this paper
In Section 2, we review the notions of LTCs and CWPs and state the results of this work formally. In Section 3, we give a high-level overview of our construction. The full details of our construction are provided in the full version of this work [15] .
PRELIMINARIES
For any n ∈ N, we denote [n] def = {1, . . . , n}. Given any string x over any alphabet, we denote its i-th symbol by xi. For any string x of length n and for any set S ⊆ [n] of indices i1 < i2 < . . . < i |S| we denote by x |S the projection
Error Correcting Codes
Let Σ be a finite alphabet. A code C is a one-to-one function from Σ k to Σ n , where k and n are called the code's message length and block length, respectively. The rate of the code is defined to be RC def = k n . We will sometimes identify C with its image C(Σ k ). Specifically, we will write c ∈ C to indicate the fact that there exists x ∈ Σ k such that c = C(x). In such case, we also say that c is a codeword of C.
For any two strings x, y ∈ Σ n , the relative Hamming distance between x and y is the fraction of coordinates on which they differ, and is denoted by δ(x, y)
The relative distance of a code C is the minimal relative distance between two different codewords of C, and is denoted by δC def = min c 1 =c 2 ∈C {δ(c1, c2)}. For a string x ∈ Σ n , we denote by δC (x) the minimal relative distance from x to the nearest codeword of C, that is, δC (x) def = minc∈C δ(x, c). If a string x satisfies δC (x) ≤ τ , we say that it is τ -close to C, otherwise we say that it is τ -far from C.
Codes with different message and codeword alphabets.
It is also possible to define codes that encode strings over one alphabet to strings over another alphabet. All of the above definitions carry through, except for the rate of the code, which is defined as follows: Let Σ and Γ denote finite alphabets, and let C : Σ k → Γ n denote a code. Then the rate of C is defined to be RC
Infinite families of codes. An infinite family of codes C = {C k } is a sequence of codes such that the code C k has message length k. The block length n(k), rate R(k) and relative distance δ(k) of such a family are functions of k such that C k has block length n(k), rate R(k) and relative distance δ(k). Throughout this paper we often work with infinite families of codes, and refer them simply as "codes". For example, we say that a code C has block length k 2 and mean that for every k, the code C k in the family C has block length k 2 .
Linear codes
Suppose that Σ = F for some finite field F. In such case we say that C :
Suppose that C :
is a linear subspace of F n , and thus for every two codewords c1, c2 ∈ C and scalars a, b ∈ F, the vector a
n , the weight of x is the fraction of non-zero coordinates of x, and is denoted by wt(x) def = δ(x, 0). Two immediate conclusions of the foregoing facts are that if C is a linear code, then the zero vector is a codeword of C, and the relative distance of C is equal to min 0 =c∈C {wt(c)}.
Consider now the case where C is a code over the alphabet F t for some natural number t. We say that C is an F-linear
, where the scalar multiplication is defined by viewing x,y,C(x) and C(y) as vectors in F kt and F nt . Note that a code that is linear over F t is necessarily F-linear, but the converse does not necessarily hold.
Concatenation of codes
We turn to describe the code concatenation technique, which is commonly used in Coding Theory for reducing the alphabet size of codes. Let Σ and Γ denote finite alphabets, where we think of Γ as being much larger than Σ. Let C1 : Σ k → Γ n and C2 : Γ → Σ denote codes. The concatenation of C1 and C2, denoted C1 C2 : Σ k → Σ n , is defined as follows: To encode a message x ∈ Σ k with C1 C2, it is first encoded by C1, and then every symbol of the result is encoded by C2. Formally, we define
We refer to C1 as the outer code and to C2 as the inner code. It is not hard to see that RC 1 C 2 = RC 1 · RC 2 and that
F-linear code and C2 : F t → F s is a linear code then their concatenation C1 C2 is a linear code over F.
Non-standard issues regarding codes
For the rest of this paper, let F denote some large finite field of some fixed size (say, |F| = 64). Unless stated explicitly otherwise, all our codes will be over the alphabet F, and will also be linear codes. The reason for using codes over F, rather than binary codes, is that one of the theorems we use requires the codes to have a very large relative distance (i.e., slightly more than 4 Ô 7/8 ≈ 0.967), and such large relative distance can only be achieved using a large enough alphabet.
For any code C : F k → F n and a set S ⊆ [n] we denote by C |S : F k → F |S| the projection of the code C to the coordinates in S. Note that the function C |S is not necessarily a code, since it is not necessarily one to one.
Probabilistic Circuits
A probabilistic circuit that tosses r coins is a circuit that is given, in addition to its input, a string of r bits that is chosen uniformly at random. The additional random string is referred as the coin tosses of the circuit, and the output of the circuit is a distribution over its coin tosses.
In this paper we use probabilistic oracle circuits. Note that the use of probabilistic circuits is not common, since a probabilistic circuit can usually be transformed into a deterministic circuit. However, we are interested in probabilistic oracle circuits that make very few queries to their oracle, and these have no deterministic counterparts.
Locally Testable Codes
A code is locally testable if it is possible to test whether a given string is a codeword, or far from being a codeword, by reading only a small number of its symbols. We now give a formal and quantative definition of this intuitive notion.
n is said to be (q, τ, ε)-Locally Testable if there exists a probabilistic oracle circuit V that satisfies the following requirements:
1. The oracle is a string over F. 2. V makes at most q non-adaptive queries to its oracle. 3. For every codeword c ∈ C, it holds that Pr [V c accepts] = 1. 4. For every string w ∈ F n that is τ -far from C, it holds that Pr [V w rejects] ≥ ε. The circuit V is called the verifier of C, the parameter q is called the query complexity of C, the parameter τ is called the distance threshold of C and the parameter ε is called the rejection probability of C.
Remark 2. The common definition of LTCs uses Turing machines instead of circuits. We chose to use a more general definition that allows circuits in order to handle the case where the code C is not explicit.
Our result can be stated as follows:
There exists an infinite family of locally testable codes {C k } k such that C k has message length k, block length k·poly (log k), relative distance Ω(1), query complexity O(1), arbitrarily small constant distance threshold τ > 0, and rejection probability Ω(1). Furthermore, the codes in the family are linear and there exists a probabilistic algorithm that on input k, runs in time poly (k) and outputs with probability 1−exp (− poly (log k)) the generating matrix and verifier circuit of C k .
The codes of Theorem 1 are over the alphabet F. Using concatenation with any binary code, one can get binary LTCs with roughly the same parameters. In particular, since F is of constant size, the concatenation will increase the query complexity of the code only by a constant factor. If one wants to get linear binary LTCs, he only needs to choose F to be an extension field of GF(2).
Codes with Proofs
We introduce the non-standard notion of "Code With Proof" (CWP). Intuitively, a CWP is a generalization of LTC, in which the verifier is given, in addition to oracle access to the tested string, an oracle access to a "proof string", which is supposed to "prove" that the tested string is indeed a codeword. Formally, a CWP is defined as follows.
n is said to be a (q, ε, m)-Code With Proof (CWP) if there exists a probabilsitic oracle circuit V that satisfies the following requirements:
1. The oracle is a string over F.
2. V makes at most q non-adaptive queries to its oracle.
3. For every codeword c ∈ C there exists a string πc ∈ F m such that Pr [V c,πc accepts] = 1. We refer to πc as a proof string of c with respect to V .
For every string w ∈ F
n and every string π ∈ F m , we have that Pr [V w,π rejects] ≥ ε · δC (w). We refer to w as the "tested string" and to π as the "proof string". The circuit V is called the verifier of C, the parameter q is called the query complexity of C, the parameter ε is called the rejection ratio of C, and the parameter m is called the proof length. We define the proof rate of C to be the ratio k/m. We will sometimes refer to the rate of C as the code rate, in order to distinguish it from the proof rate.
A stronger soundness requirement. Note that the soundness requirement of CWPs (Definition 2, Requirement 4) is stronger than the corresponding requirement of LTCs (Definition 1, Requirement 4). In particular, the definition of LTCs requires the verifier to reject only strings that are far from the code, while the definition of CWPs requires the verifier to reject any non-codeword with adequate probability. This difference between the soundness requirements is an artifact of the transformation of CWPs to LTCs, which losses the stronger soundness property. 
CWPs imply

CWPs and PCPPs.
A reader who is familiar with the PCP literature will note that the notion of CWP is a special case of the notion of PCP of Proximity (PCPP), introduced in [4] and [9] . Specifically, CWPs are good codes coupled with PCPPs that are able to prove membership in those codes. In constrast, in the PCP literature one usually constructs PCPPs for N P-complete sets. Hence, CWPs are weaker than the PCPPs that are usually constructed, which corresponds with our goal of constructing LTCs without PCP machinery.
HIGH-LEVEL OVERVIEW
In this section, we give a high-level overview of our main construction. This construction yields CWPs that almost achieve the parameters of Theorem 2, but have query complexity poly (log k) and rejection ratio 1/ poly (log k). In order to obtain CWPs of constant query complexity and constant rejection ratio, as stated in Theorem 2, we apply a known query reduction technique and the gap amplification technique of Dinur [8] (see the full version of this paper [15, Sec. 6] for details). We then transform the latter CWPs to LTCs with good parameters using a standard transformation (see Appendix A). In Section 3.1, we describe a simplified construction of CWPs that has the required parameters and works under some simplifying assumption. In Section 3.2, we show how to remove the simplifying assumption and describe the full construction.
A simplified construction of CWPs with good parameters
Our construction works by starting from a code of small message length, which is trivially a CWP, and gradually increasing its message length. Specifically, we design a transformation that transforms a CWP C into a CWP C with the following effect on the parameters:
Rate R R Relative distance δ δ Proof rate P γ · P for a constant γ < 1 Query complexity q β · q for a constant β > 1 Rejection ratio ε α · ε for a constant α < 1 Having designed a transformation as stated in Table 2 , we construct CWPs with the parameters stated in Table 1 by starting with a trivial CWP of constant message length and iteratively applying the transformation for O (log log k) iterations. The transformation consists of three basic operations:
1. Tensor Product -In order to increase the message length, we use the tensor product operation. This operation squares the message length, but also squares the rate and the relative distance. See Section 3.1.1 for details. 2. Random Projection -This operation increases the rate.
See Section 3.1.2 for details. 3. Distance Amplification -This operation increases the relative distance. See Section 3.1.3 for details. By applying the basic operations one after the other, we obtain the transformation stated in Table 2 . In the rest of this subsection, we describe each of the operations in detail.
Tensor product of CWPs
Given a code C of message length k and block length n, the tensor product of C with itself, denoted C 2 , is a code of message length k 2 and block length n 2 defined as follows.
To encode a message x ∈ F k 2 , viewed as a k × k matrix, we first encode every row of x with C. Let y be the resulting k × n matrix. We then encode every column of y with C, and define the resulting n×n matrix to be C 2 (x). Note that if C has rate R, then C 2 has rate R 2 . It is also easy to prove that if C has relative distance δ then the relative distance of C 2 is δ 2 (see [18, Lecture 6] ). The tensor product is one of the simplest ways to obtain a code of large message length from a code of small message length. We would like to use tensor product to increase the message length of our CWPs. In order to do so, we need to show that if C is a CWP, then C 2 is a CWP with related parameters.
One can show, using the linearity of C, that the codewords of C 2 are exactly the n × n matrices all of whose rows and columns are codewords of C (see [18, Lecture 6] ). If C is a CWP, then this fact suggests the following natural verifier for C 2 : Given an n × n matrix to be tested, the verifier chooses either a random row or a column of the matrix, and invokes the verifier of C to test whether this row/column is a codeword of C. Note that in order to implement this idea, we need to provide the verifier of C 2 with the proof strings that prove that each row and column of the matrix are codewords of C.
We thus define the verifier of C 2 as follows: Given oracle access to a tested string w and a proof string π, the verifier of C 2 views w as an n×n matrix and interprets π as a collection of strings π1, . . . , π2n such that every string πi corresponds to some row or column of w. The verifier of C 2 then chooses a random row/column and emulates the verifier of C with oracle access to this row/column and to its corresponding proof string πi. The verifier of C 2 accepts if and only if the verifier of C accepts. Does this natural verifier "work"? It turns out that while in some important cases the answer is "yes" (see [16, 10] ), in the general case, the answer is "no" (see [19, 7, 12] ). However, in this subsection we assume that that the answer is "yes" also in the general case. Specifically, we assume the following:
Simplifying Assumption for CWPs:. There exists a con-
the code C 2 is a (q, α · ε, 2n · m)-CWP with respect to the verifier and proof strings described above.
Note the effect of the tensor product on the proof rate. Specifically, if C has proof rate P , then C 2 has proof rate 1 2 · R · P . A crucial point now becomes visible -the tensor product does not square P , but rather multiplies it by R.
Random Projection
We now describe the random projection operation, which we use to improve the rate of the CWPs. Let C : F k → F n be a CWP. The most straightforward way to increase the rate of C is to project C to a subset S ⊆ [n]. This poses two problems: 1. The function C |S does not necessarily have a good relative distance. Moreover, C |S may not be one-to-one. 2. The function C |S may not be a CWP. In particular, we can no longer use the verifier of C, because this verifier may query one of the coordinates that were projected out. The first issue is solved by choosing the subset S ⊆ [n] uniformly at random. It can be shown that if S is a sufficiently large random set, then with high probability the function C |S is a code that maintains the relative distance of C up to a constant factor. The second issue is solved by providing the verifier of C with the "missing coordinates" in the proof string. That is, for every c ∈ C, we define the proof string of the codeword c |S ∈ C |S to contain c |[n]\S in addition to the proof string of c. We refer to the operation of choosing a random subset of the coordinates, projecting the code to this subset, and moving the other coordinates to the proof part as Random Projection.
At first look, including the missing coordinates in the proof part seems weird. Our goal in projecting out those coordinates was reducing the redudancy of C. If we just move those coordinates from the codeword part to the proof part, it seems that we do not gain anything in terms of redundancy.
One of the most important observations of this work is that decreasing the block length of a CWP at the expense of increasing its proof length is beneficial. The reason is that while the tensor product operation squares the block length, it only multiplies the proof length by a factor that depends on the block length. Thus, decreasing the block length of a CWP C improves the proof length of C 2 . This effect turns out to be very significant, and therefore moving coordinates from the codeword part to the proof part, while not giving an "immediate" gain in the redundancy (in C), is beneficial in the "long run" (in C 2 ). To see it, suppose that a single iteration of our construction consisted of applying a tensor product to the CWP, and then applying random projection to the CWP to increase its code rate back to what it was before the tensor product. Consider the effect of applying such iterations to a CWP of code rate R and proof rate P . Assume that P ≤ R, and note that in such case the random projection decreases the proof rate by a factor of at most 2. After the first iteration, the CWP will have code rate R and proof rate 1 4 · R · P , because the tensor product multiplies the proof rate by 1 2 · R and the random projection multiplies the proof rate by 1 2 (since we assume P ≤ R). After the second iteration, the CWP will have code rate R and proof rate 1 4 · R ¡ 2 ·P . In general, after i iterations the CWP will have code rate R and proof rate 1 4 · R ¡ i · P . It is now easy to see the benefit of the random projection: Had our iteration consisted only of tensor product, then after i iterations the CWP would have had code rate of R
. We conclude that, by using random projection to maintain the code rate the same in all iterations, we can make the proof rate decrease by only a constant factor in each iteration, as stated in Table 2 .
Remark 3. Note that the random projection operation has a certain error probability. Specifically, if the random projection is applied to a CWP C of message length k, then with probability exp (−Ω (k)) over the choice of the set S, the function C |S is not guaranteed to be one-to-one, or to have a good relative distance.
Distance Amplification
We turn to describe the distance amplification operation, which we use to improve the relative distance of the CWPs. Specifically, we present a distance amplification procedure that can increase the relative distance of a code from any constant to any constant that is smaller than
|F|−1 |F|
, while decreasing the rate by only a constant factor. We comment that similiar distance amplification procedures are known in coding theory literature for quite some time (see, e.g., [1] ). Our contribution is merely observing that these procedures preserve local testability.
Let C : F k → F n be a code with relative distance δ. We wish to improve the relative distance of C while not decreasing its rate by too much. In order to do so, we take the following view on the relative distance of C: Consider the "experiment" that given a non-zero codeword c ∈ C, chooses a random coordinate i ∈ [n] and "succeeds" if ci is non-zero. Since the relative distance of C is the minimal weight of a non-zero codeword of C, the probability that the above experiment succeeds is δ. Furthermore, the experiment tosses only log n coins.
Observe that improving the relative distance of C while incuring only a small loss to the rate of C is analogous to increasing the success probability of the above experiment while not tossing too many additional coins. One possible way of improving the success probability in a randomness efficient manner is taking random walks on expander graph. Let G be a d-regular expander on n vertices with relative second eigenvalue λ. We identify the vertices of G with the coordinates of c. The probability that a random walk of length t of G hits a coordinate i such that ci = 0 is at least 1 − (1 − δ + λ) t . Furthermore, such a random walk tosses only log n + t log d coins.
We adapt the above method to the problem of improving the relative distance of C. Define a code C :
t n as follows (Note that the codewords of C are over the alphabet F t+1 ): Let x ∈ F k be a message. We identify every coordinate of C(x) with a vertex of G and every coordinate of C (x) with a walk of length t on G. Now, for every walk (i0, . . . , it) ∈ [n] t of length t on G we define the coordinate of C (x) that corresponds to (i0, . . . , it) to be
By the discussion above, the relative distance of C is at least 1 − (1 − δ + λ) t . We finish the distance amplification procedure with reducing the alphabet of C back to F by concatenating C with some good inner code over the alphabet F. Let DistAmp(C) denote the result of the concatenation. By choosing t to be a sufficiently large constant and by choosing an inner code of sufficiently large relative distance, we can amplify the relative distance of C to any constant less than
, while decreasing the rate of C only by a constant factor which depends on t and on the inner code.
The local testability of DistAmp(C). In order to use the distance amplification procedure, we need to show that if C is a CWP then so is DistAmp(C). We sketch the argument below.
Assume that C is a CWP. We begin by observing that C is a CWP: The reason is that the transformation from C(x) to C (x) that was described in Equation 1 can be viewed as applying a certain repetition code to c. Thus, verifying that a string is a codeword of C amounts to testing a repetition code and emulating the verifier of C. Now, to show that DistAmp(C) is a CWP, observe that a verifier for DistAmp(C) can emulate the verifier of C as follows: Whenever the verifier of C queries a coordinate i, the verifier of DistAmp(C) reads the supposed encoding of the coordinate i, checks that it is a legal codeword of the inner code, and uses it to answer the query of the verifier of C .
Note that the verifier of DistAmp(C) uses more queries than the verifier of C. Specifically, every time we apply distance amplification to a CWP, its query complexity increases by a constrant factor. However, we can afford this increase, since it still matches the parameters stated in Table 2 .
Remark 4. The distance amplification procedure described above is only one way out of many to improve the relative distance of a code. A similiar way was described in [1] , who used neighbourhoods of vertices in a bipartite expander instead of random walks on a non-bipartite expander. Furthermore, as explained above, the intuition of the distance amplification comes from amplifying hitting probabilities, and therefore any randomness efficient hitter can be used for distance amplification. For example, one could take neighbourhoods of vertices in a disperser instead of a bipartite expander.
The construction so far
Using the ideas described in this subsection, we can now present a simplified construction of CWPs with good parameters. Suppose we wish to construct a CWP with message length k, rate R and relative distance δ. For some constant k0, let C0 : F k 0 → F n 0 be a code, and note that C0 is trivially a CWP with query complexity n0, rejection ratio 1 and proof length 0. We define a sequence of CWPs {Ci} i , where the CWP Ci+1 is obtained from from Ci as follows: to improve its relative distance back to δ. Set Ci+1 to be the result. It is not hard to see that C log log k 0 k has message length k, proof rate and rejection ratio 1/ poly (log k), query complexity poly (log k), constant rate and constant relative distance, as stated in Table 1 .
Removing the simplifying assumption
A crucial issue, of course, is removing the simplifying assumption (of Section 3.1.1). Recall that this assumption is that for every CWP C, the code C 2 is a CWP with related parameters. This assumption is not true in general. However, we can use a special case (presented in [5] ) for which the assumption is true in order to make our construction work. The result of [5] says, roughly, that if a CWP C is of the form C = C 2 s for some code Cs, then C 2 is a CWP with related parameters (Note that Cs is not necessarily a CWP). We note that the result of [5] uses a slightly more sophisticated verifier for C 2 than the row/column verifier we used before. We describe this verifier in more detail in Section 3.3.
We say that a code C is of a square form if there exists a code Cs such that C = C 2 s . In order to use the result of [5] , we need to make sure that every CWP to which we apply tensor product is of a square form. To do so, we will maintain this form as an invariant throughout the iterations of our construction: We will start with an initial CWP that is of a square form, and then show that every iteration preserves the square form. In order to show that a single iteration preserves the square form, we will need to modify the random projection and distance amplification operations such that they preserve the square form (while the tensor product trivially preserves the square form). In Section 3.3.1, we describe the required modification of the random projection and the distance amplification operations. ). Thus, we will have to make sure that the relative distance of Cs is that large. Such relative distance can be achieved using the distance amplficiation. The need to have codes of such high relative distance is the reason why we need to work with codes over some sufficiently large finite field F instead of binary codes.
The Axis Parallel Planes Test
In this subsection, we describe the verifier of [5] that is used in Section 3.2. Let Cs be a code with block length ns, and let C = C The latter characterization of the codewords of C 2 suggests the following "planes verifier" for C 2 : Given a tested string w, the verifier views w as a 4-dimensional hypercube, chooses a random axis parallel plane of w and verifies that it is a codeword of C (by emulating the verifier of C). It turns out that this verifier works well. Using a result of [5] , we show that if C is a CWP with rejection ratio ε, then C 2 with the planes verifier is a CWP with rejection ratio 2 −32 ·ε (see [15, Section 4.2] for details). Note that in order for the "planes verifier" to work, it needs to be given access to the proof strings of all the axis parallel planes. Thus, the proof string of a codeword c of C 2 will consist of the proof strings that prove that each axis parallel plane of c is a codeword of C. It can be shown that if C has block length n = n 2 s and proof length m, then C 2 has proof length 4 2 ¡ ·n·m = 6·n·m, rather than 2 · n · m as in Section 3.1.1. However, the extra factor of 3 is immaterial.
Preserving the Square Form
In this subsection we describe how we modify the random projection and distance amplification operations such that they preserve the square form of the CWP. Let us focus for now on the random projection operation. Let C : F k → F n be a CWP of a square form, that is, C = C 2 s for some code Cs : F ks → F ns . Suppose we want to improve the rate of C. If we project C to some random subset of coordinates S ⊆ [n], it is unlikely that that C |S will be of a square form, since the probability that the subset S will have the form of a square is very low.
The solution to the problem is to apply random projection to Cs instead of C. That is, in order to improve the rate of C, we choose a set T ⊆ [ns] uniformly at random and take C s|T ¡ 2 to be our new CWP. Clearly, C s|T ¡ 2 is of a square form and has a better rate than
We use the same solution for the distance amplification operation: In order to improve the relative distance of C, we take (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 to be our new CWP. The code (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 is of a square form and has a better relative distance than C. However, it is not clear why should (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 be a CWP. The way of showing that (DistAmp (Cs)) 2 is a CWP is another novelty of this paper. We begin by observing that applying distance amplification to a codeword of Cs is a linear operation -that is, there is a linear function A such that for every message xs ∈ F ks it holds that A (Cs(xs)) = (DistAmp(Cs)) (xs). We proceed by viewing (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 as follows. In order to encode a message x ∈ F k with (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 , view x as ks × ks matrix and perform the following steps:
1. Encode every row of x with Cs. Denote the result by x 1 .
2. Apply A to every row of x 1 . Denote the result by x 2 .
3. Encode every column of x 2 with Cs. Denote the result by x 3 .
4. Apply A to every column of x 3 . Set (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 (x) to be the result.
We claim that using the linearity of Cs and A, we can switch the order of Steps 2 and 3. After switching the order, the encoding procedure of (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 becomes:
1. Encode x with C = C 2 s . Denote the result by x 1 .
3. Apply A to every column of x 2 . Set (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 (x) to be the result.
Thus, (DistAmp(Cs))
2 (x) is obtained by applying A many times to parts of C(x). We next show that a verifier of (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 can test a candidate codeword by emulating the verifier of C. While we could prove the latter claim directly, such a proof would have been quite complicated. Instead, we develop a general framework that allows us to give a cleaner formulation of this argument.
A general framework. In order to prove that (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 is a CWP, we develop a general framework for proving such claims. This framework allows us to give a simple and elegant proof of the argument sketched in this subsection, and may be of independent interest. We first define the composition of two codes to be the composition of their encoding functions, and define a non-standard notion of "repetition codes". We then examine the structure of (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 and observe that it can be obtained by composing C with repetition codes and permuting its coordinates. Next, we identify some simple properties such that composing a code having those properties with a CWP yields a CWP. Finally, we show that repetition codes have the aforementioned properties and conclude that (DistAmp(Cs)) 2 is a CWP. For more details regarding those framework and proof, see the full version of this work [15, Sec. 5] For a simple example of how a code can be obtained using repetitions and permutations, consider the code C of Section 3.1.3 (see Equation 1) , and view its codewords as strings over the alphabet F (rather than F t+1 ). Observe that the codewords of C can be obtained by duplicating the symbols of the codewords of C and permuting their coordinates. Although the latter example may seem trivial, the framework we develop in this work allows expressing more complicated codes (e.g., DistAmp(C) and C 2 ) as results of composing C with repetition codes.
The full construction
We now review the full construction. Suppose we wish to construct a CWP of message length k. For some constant k0, let C0 : F k 0 → F n 0 be a code with rate R and relative distance δ. We start by viewing the code C We now have that C log log k 0 k−1 2 is a CWP with message length k and with the parameters stated in Table 1 .
There is one more issue that needs to be handled. Recall that the random projection operation has error probability of exp (−Ω (k)). Thus, the construction outlined above has error probability of at least exp −Ω k 2 0 ¡¡ , which is a constant. In order to achieve error probability of at most exp (− poly (log k)) (as stated in Theorem 2), we choose k0 to be poly (log k) instead of a constant. This choice increases the query complexity the final CWP by a factor of poly (log k), which we can afford.
2. We are not guaranteed that errors in the proof string are detected by the verifier. That is, consider the case where the verifier of C is given oracle access to a string cπ , where c ∈ C and π is very far from πc. In such a case, cπ may be very far from C , but the verifier of C is not guaranteed to reject cπ at all.
The solution to both problems is to use many copies of the codeword such that their length dominates the length of the resulting codeword. That is, we define
such that · |C(x)| ¬ ¬ π C(x) ¬ ¬ . Defining C this way ensures that any harm caused by the proof strings is absorbed by the codewords. For example, note that even if πc 1 = πc 2 for some distinct codewords c1, c2 ∈ C, the corresponding codewords c1 . . . c1πc 1 and c2 . . . c2πc 2 of C are guaranteed to be very far, because those codewords differ on a lot of coordinates in the c1 . . . c1 and c2 . . . c2 part, and this part dominates the πc 1 and πc 2 part.
